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Large, urban tertiary care hospitals often acquire outlying community hospitals.  One possible 
motivation is to increase referrals.  Sophisticated acquirers may even attempt to concentrate additional 
referrals among more profitable patients.  We explore these issues by studying 26 vertical 
acquisitions in Florida and New York that occurred in the late 1990s, a peak period for such 
transactions.  We compare changes in referrals of patients from target market areas to changes 
in a matched set of control markets.  We find that roughly 30 percent of the vertical acquisitions 
resulted in a significant increase in referrals to the acquirer.  Very few acquisitions were 
followed by decreases in referrals.  When acquisitions did lead to increased referrals, the effect 
was usually largest for patients with more remunerative insurance and patients undergoing 
more profitable procedures.  However, we find no evidence that hospitals selectively avoided 
referrals of patients with severe conditions for which costs might exceed reimbursements. 
 
 
Keywords: Hospitals, Mergers and Acquisitions, Referrals, Patient Selection 
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1. Introduction 
  During the 1990s, hospitals consolidated at an unprecedented pace.
1 Many of these 
hospital mergers had a distinctly vertical flavor, involving the acquisition of a “plain vanilla” 
community hospital by a high tech tertiary care hospital. Burns and Pauly (2002) identify several 
potential goals of such integration, including improving productive efficiency.
2 Burns and Pauly 
also suggest that many acquiring hospitals viewed their targets as “feeder” hospitals and 
expected the acquisitions to result in increased referrals. 
This paper studies whether vertical integration did in fact generate increased referrals. To 
our knowledge, the only other study that addresses this issue is Huckman (2006), which finds 
that vertical hospital integration in New York State led to increased referrals for cardiac surgery. 
We advance upon Huckman’s work in a number of ways. First, we study both Florida and New 
York. Second, we study each acquisition individually, rather than report an overall trend. This 
refinement to the empirical strategy allows us to explore the distribution of acquisition effects in 
greater detail. For example, while Huckman finds that, on average, acquisitions led to increases 
in referrals (a finding we replicate with our sample of acquisitions), we find that this occurs only 
in a minority of acquisitions. Additionally, we use a matched target-control framework that 
generates more reliable estimates of the acquisition effect.  
We also explore the interesting possibility that hospitals change referrals patterns 
selectively. Our motivation for this extension is very simple: not all hospital inpatient admissions 
are equally profitable. The extent to which hospitals engage in selective referrals is a key issue 
                                                 
1 See Bazzoli et al. (2001) and Thorpe et al. (2000).  
 
2 Analysts have identified many rationales for horizontal hospital consolidations, including market power and 
economies of scale. For example, see Conner et al. (1998) and Dranove and Shanley (1995). 
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for a number of ongoing policy debates. For example, as detailed in the next section, private 
hospitals are often accused of shunning Medicaid and other indigent patients, leaving public 
hospitals to shoulder the burden. To take another example, allegations that physician-owners of 
specialty hospitals opportunistically distort their referral decisions led Congress to insert a 
provision banning the construction of new physician-owned specialty hospitals into the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003.  We examine whether hospitals engage in three distinct forms of 
selective referrals, explained in detail in Section 2.2: insurer-based, procedure-based, and 
severity-based selection. We find evidence of the first two forms of selection, but reject the 
hypothesis that acquirers engage in severity-based selective referrals.  
 
2. The Hospitalization Decision 
2.1 Acquiring Referrals 
Patients cannot admit themselves to a hospital; only licensed physicians with admitting 
privileges can do so. This would be a distinction without a difference if physicians acted as 
perfect agents for their patients. In practice, physicians can strongly influence patients’ 
admissions decisions.
3 As is typical in principal-agent relationships, such as the patient-physician 
relationship, patients lack the necessary information to discern whether their physician’s referrals 
are driven solely by the interests of the patient, or by other factors.
4 As a result, hospitals seeking 
to increase referrals might conclude that the “way to patients’ hearts” is through their physicians. 
For example, in the 1970s and 1980s hospitals tried to induce physician referrals by purchasing 
                                                 
3 See, for example, the surveys of patients by Sarel (2005) and Smithson (2003). 
 
4 Over 40 years ago, Arrow (1963) observed that, “…because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information 
possessed by the physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very much greater 
than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed by both parties. Further, both parties are aware of this information, 
and their relation is colored by this knowledge.”   5
costly medical equipment and extensive staffing of allied medical personnel, a practice dubbed 
“the medical arms race.”
5 The emergence of managed care and the concomitant practices of 
utilization review and selective contracting reduced the effectiveness of this tactic.
6  
Beginning in the early 1990s, a new strategy gained prominence as large tertiary care 
hospitals began acquiring physician practices and community hospitals, anticipating that they 
would “acquire” their patients as well. They were forced to integrate, rather than contract, by 
ethical and legal constraints. In particular, the 1972 Anti-Kickback Law formalized the medical 
profession’s longstanding ethical ban on payment for referrals; additional restrictions were later 
imposed under the 1989 and 1995 Stark I and Stark II laws.
7  
The Anti-Kickback Law subjects any physician who “knowingly and willfully solicits or 
receives any remuneration [for referring Medicare or Medicaid patients]” to civil and criminal 
charges. While seemingly strict, prosecutions under this law were rare (Hyman 2001). Morrison 
(2000) attributes this rarity to the difficulty of establishing intent and the ambiguity of the phrase 
“knowingly and willfully.” Stark I banned referrals of Medicare patients for clinical laboratory 
services if the referring physician has a financial relationship with the laboratory, regardless of 
the intent of the parties. Stark II expanded the ban on physician-provider payments to include all 
                                                 
5 Robinson and Luft (1985). Costly and high-tech medical equipment is a consumption good for many doctors and 
thus, in the medical arms race model, serves as in-kind compensation for referrals. Similarly, physicians prefer high 
staffing levels to low ones. 
 
6 Zwanziger and Melnick (1988). 
 
7 See Anti-Kickback Law (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)); Stark I/II (42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; Social Security Act § 1877 and 
§1903(s)). In 1992, the Health Care Financing Administration, since renamed the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), issued a set of physician referral guidelines and outlined a number of safe harbors for 
permitted referral activities (42 C.F.R. § 411.350).   6
hospital services reimbursed under Medicare or Medicaid, also without regard to intent. The two 
states we study, New York and Florida, have additional laws governing compensated referrals.
8 
Certain forms of payment are permitted under all three of these laws. For example, the 
Anti-Kickback Law  allows “payments pursuant to employment relationships” as well as 
payments between tax-exempt hospitals providing shared services if they form “cooperative 
hospital service organizations.”
9 Similarly, Stark II allows physicians to refer patients to hospitals 
where they have minimal ownership interests. Additionally, while Stark laws prohibit payments 
from an employer to a physician that are contingent upon the volume or value o f referrals, 
physicians are allowed receive productivity bonuses (Morrison 2000). Overall, ownership of a 
physician group gives a hospital more latitude, though still limited, to encourage physician 
referrals from that group. To be entirely safe, physicians whose practices are acquired should be 
able to demonstrate that changes in referrals serve patients’ best interests  – for example, by 
demonstrating that the acquirer has improved quality.  
There are a number of ways in which acquiring hospitals might expect the acquisition of 
feeder hospitals to increase referrals, none of which necessarily run afoul of the law. The acquirer 
may grant admitting privileges to the medical staff of the target as well as acquire any physician 
practices owned by the target. Specialists at the acquirer and the feeder medical staffs may begin 
sharing information, for example through meetings or unified clinical information systems. The 
acquirer might establish a stronger presence in the feeder’s community, increasing demand 
                                                 
 
8 Florida applies provisions similar to the Stark restrictions to all patients, regardless of insurer (Florida Patient Self-
Referral Act of 1992, Florida Statutes, 456.654); New York does allow compensated referrals for inpatient services 
where not prohibited by Stark, but requires the physician to disclose any financial interests in the referred provider 
(NY Pub. Health Law, Title II-D, § 238.)  
 
9 Hyman (2001) and Morrison (2000) discuss employment relationships; Hubbel et al. (2006) and Morrison (2000) 
discuss the relationship between referral regulations and cooperative ventures.    7
directly through patients. In any event, Burns and Pauly’s (2002) survey of hospital executives 
indicates that acquirers clearly expected a payoff in terms of increasing admissions. As detailed 
below, an acquirer might even be able to “cherry-pick” the most profitable patients from the 
target hospital’s market or “dump” the least profitable, further increasing the profitability of the 
acquisition.  
Vertical integration can also generate increased referrals to the acquirer if it is 
accompanied by quality enhancements. Unless such enhancements are specific to the 
acquirer/target pair, such as a unified clinical information system, we expect quality 
improvements to generate increased referrals from other market areas as well. We take care in 
our empirical work to distinguish between increased volume resulting from a general increase in 
quality at the acquiring hospital and increased volume specific to the target hospital’s market 
area. 
 
2.2 Referrals and Profits 
Although revenues per admission vary by payer (e.g., Medicaid versus private insurance) 
and disease, hospitals expect to at least cover incremental costs for most admissions. A recent 
study by Friedman et al. (2004) indicates that for the average hospital in several states studied, 
total inpatient revenue exceeds total cost. Friedman et al. also find that the revenue to total cost 
ratio varies by payer but is never lower than 75.4% (Medicaid in California, the stingiest payer in 
their study). Accordingly, if fixed costs constitute more than 25% of total costs, as strongly 
suggested by Friedman and Pauly (1981), as well as by cursory examination of hospital expense   8
data, then it stands to reason that even the least remunerative insured patients generate positive 
net marginal revenues on average.
10 
This does not imply that all admissions are equally profitable. Friedman et al. (2004) 
finds that Medicaid is a stingy payer relative to Medicare and traditional indemnity insurers. 
Profits also vary by type of treatment. There is a general consensus that cardiac treatment is more 
profitable than most other treatments. For example, Huckman (2006) estimates that average 
margins are $3900 for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgery and $2700 for 
Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA); more importantly, he estimates that 
marginal profits are $6200 for CABG and $4900 for PTCA. The implied double digit profit 
margins for these procedures are well above hospitals’ overall margins.  
Two patients who receive the same treatment and have the same insurer may not be 
equally profitable. Medicare and some private insurers pay hospitals a fixed fee per admission 
based on the diagnosis related group, or DRG. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) attempts to set DRG payments near the mean cost of treating each diagnosis, but cost can 
still vary significantly within a diagnosis. For example, Dranove (1987) observes that the 
coefficient of variation of treatment costs exceeds 1 for many DRGs. Because revenue is fixed 
and costs vary, the profitability of patients in a given DRG varies inversely with expected 
treatment costs.  
This discussion suggests that if it is costly for an acquirer to expand admissions, it might 
not seek to do so across-the-board. Acquirers might instead focus their efforts on patients with 
good insurance, patients with cardiac disease and other relatively profitable conditions, and 
                                                 
10 There are no definitive studies of the incremental profitability of admissions. This somewhat dated study by 
Friedman and Pauly pegs long run variable cost at just half of total cost. Analysis of (unaudited) accounting data 
suggests that allocated overhead may amount to as much as half of total costs.   9
relatively healthy patients within each diagnostic class. Respectively, we label these three 
mechanisms insurance-based, procedure-based, and severity-based selective referrals. Hospitals 
may use several tactics to implement these strategies, including judicious granting of admission 
privileges, strategic location of outpatient facilities, service enhancements (e.g., using the latest 
coronary stents), advertising ( e.g., promoting a cardiac care “center of excellence”), cajoling 
admitting physicians, or through outright refusal of transfers based on expected profitability.  
Several prior studies of admission patterns suggest that hospitals pursue such strategies. 
Duggan (2002) finds that the introduction of a state program to increase payments to hospitals 
that treat medically indigent resulted in a shift of Medicaid patients from government-owned to 
private hospitals. Newhouse (1989) finds that patients in less profitable DRGs are more likely to 
be admitted to publicly-owned hospitals. While these studies present strong evidence of payer-
based selective referrals, evidence of  severity-based selection is mixed. Rosko and Carpenter 
(1994) find that intra-DRG severity of illness is positively related to expenditures and is 
inversely related to hospital profits, indicating the potential for severity-based referrals to 
increase profits. Even so, Newhouse (1989) finds that high-severity patients are no more likely to 
be treated at public hospitals than private hospitals, suggesting that private hospitals do not shun 
high-severity patients. However, a more recent study by Meltzer et al. (2002) finds that after 
Medicare introduced the Prospective Payment System (PPS), hospitals selectively reduced 
spending on the most severely ill and thus the most costly patients within the same DRGs. They 
conclude that hospitals do attempt to discourage admissions of unprofitable patients by lowering 
the quality and treatment intensity for such patients. They also find the same trend for non-
Medicare patients, suggesting that hospitals changed their practice style for the entire set of 
patients.    10 
A common thread throughout the papers cited in this section is evidence that physicians, 
or at least some physicians, can and do respond to economic incentives in making their referral 
and admission decisions.
11 Indeed, this proposition is the reason for the existence of the laws 
described in the previous section. The underlying mechanisms that create such incentives are 
largely unexplored in the current literature, treated instead as a black box. Exploring the contents 
of that box is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we follow the literature and take the 
existence of such mechanisms as given and explore whether, and how, they are manifested in the 
context of acquisitions of feeder hospitals.  
 
3. Estimation Method 
3.1 Identification of Hospital Acquisition 
We study consolidations in which one of the hospitals may be considered a tertiary care 
hospital and the other is not. For New York, we use the list of hospital acquisitions provided to us 
by Robert Huckman, limiting our analysis in New York to acquisitions that occurred from 1996 
to 1999, for a total of 21 hospital pairs.
12 We also examine six acquisitions in Florida, which we 
identify using from data obtained from Irvin Levin Associates.
13  
                                                 
11 Yet another example is the ongoing debate over economic credentialing – hospitals denying admitting privileges 
to physicians based on economic criteria, such as an ownership stake in a rival ambulatory surgery center, rather 
than clinical criteria. See, e.g., Nagele (2003).  
 
12 We study these states and years primarily because of data availability. This was a also peak period for vertical 
acquisitions: 23 out of 35 mergers studied by Huckman (2006) occurred in this window.  
 
13 We add Florida primarily because of data availability. In Florida a large number of community care hospitals were 
acquired by “vertical health systems” during the time period, but the majority of them were parts of large but 
disjointed health systems, such as Columbia/HCA. We view these as system expansions rather than potentially 
vertical mergers. After excluding such system expansions, we are left with six vertical mergers in Florida.  
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Following Huckman (2006), we identify transactions in which one hospital provided 
open heart surgery and the other did not.
14 We define the former as the acquirers and the latter as 
the targets and study admission patterns for CABG and PTCA procedures. Based on American 
Hospital Association data, we observe that the acquirers invariably offer a wider range of 
specialized services, such as radiation therapy and transplants, than their targets (see Appendix 
A). Thus, we also study admission patterns for a broader class of tertiary care services that we 
define below. This is an important extension because, as Huckman observes, cardiac services are 
generally believed t o be more profitable than most other hospital services and may therefore 
exhibit different post-acquisition referral effects.  
 
3.2 Identification of Referral Effects 
Our goal is to determine whether patients who reside in the target hospital’s market area 
are more likely to obtain cardiac and other tertiary care services at the acquiring hospital after the 
acquisition. To do so, we need to control for the possibility that the acquiring hospital becomes 
more attractive to all patients, not just those in the target market (see Figure 1). We do this by 
identifying, for each target hospital market, a set of “control” markets. The control markets have 
two important features: (a) prior to the acquisition, the acquirer’s share of patients in the control 
market was comparable to its share in the target market, and (b) the patients in the control market 
would not normally consider visiting the target hospital (and would therefore be unaffected by 
the acquisition, except to the extent that it was associated with overall improved quality at the 
                                                 
14 In a few cases, the acquiring organization included several tertiary care hospitals. In such cases, we attempted to 
identify a single “flagship” acquiring hospital based on AHA data and the system’s web page. When no clear 
flagship hospital existed, we treat the system’s tertiary hospital closest to the target as the acquirer. In Florida, we 
use the condition the acquirer performed at least 50 surgeries and the target no more than 20 over the sample period.    12 
acquiring hospital.) With suitable control markets in hand, we can determine whether the 
acquirer’s share increased more within the target market than in the control markets. 
We used a flexible approach to define target and control markets, letting common sense 
be our guide. As illustrated in Figure 2, we began by considering the set of all zip codes within a 
fixed radius of the acquiring hospital. The size of the radius varied inversely with the size of the 
MSA in which the target was located. Thus, for targets in the largest MSAs, we only included zip 
codes within a 5 mile radius; for the smallest MSAs, we used a 25 mile radius (all the 
acquisitions we studied were in MSAs). We then sought to identify a set of candidate control zip 
codes that are (1) closer to the acquirer than they were to the target, and (2) not located in 
between the acquirer and the target. Thus patients in our ideal control markets had the potential 
to visit the acquirer, but were unlikely to select the target hospital.  
A number of complicating factors force us to manually tailor the target and control zip 
codes for some acquisitions. In several cases, a single acquirer purchased several hospitals in the 
same year. In such cases, we choose the control group so that none of the control zip codes were 
near any of the target hospitals, because our key identifying assumption is that the changes in 
shares in the control markets reveal the changes in market share that the acquiring hospital would 
experience in the absence of an acquisition. More mundanely, we also exclude zip codes in cases 
where intervening bodies of water and the locations of bridges imply that they are not properly 
part of either the target or control markets, despite short straight line distances. 
In four cases, the target and the acquirer are very close neighbors.
15 We question whether 
it is appropriate to examine the referral issue in this context, as the vertical issue of referrals is 
                                                 
15 In Florida, there were two purchases of targets in the same zip code as the acquirer: Halifax’s purchase of 
Atlantic-Daytona and Shands’ purchase of Methodist Medical Center. In New York, New York Hospital purchased a 
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intertwined with horizontal issues such as market power and clinical integration. Pragmatically, 
the set of zip codes in this case that are close to the acquirer but far from the target is nearly 
empty. Primarily to compare our results with the results in Huckman (2006), we do our best to 
identify a reasonable set of target and candidate control markets for these cases, though we are 
skeptical of the results obtained from these particular acquisitions. 
While this procedure is necessarily ad hoc for some of the mergers, we believe that, with 
the possible exception of  a few acquisitions involving a proximate target, we constructed 
reasonable target and control areas for each acquisition. A complete set of maps identifying the 
target and candidate control zip codes for each acquisition is available upon request.  
After identifying a set of candidate controls, we winnow the set of candidate control zip 
codes into the set of actual control zip codes by matching on pre-acquisition market shares. This 
step is crucial because of the underlying nonlinearity of the logit demand specification we use in 
the empirical model. This nonlinearity can generate misleading results in difference-in-
differences analyses.
16 To eliminate this concern, we select control markets in which the 
acquirer’s share is “close” to its share in the target market. To implement this, we calculate each 
acquirer’s zip code level market share in the pre-acquisition period, which we define as 
beginning at the start of our data and continuing to 2 years prior to the acquisition year.
17 To be 
                                                                                                                                                             
neighboring hospital, Flushing Medical Center, and Buffalo General’s purchased Buffalo Columbus Hospital, 
located 1.2 miles away. 
 
16 In particular, when a predictor variable in a logit regression changes value, the predicted change in the dependent 
variable depends on the initial market share. For example, suppose that the initial market shares of the acquiring 
hospital in the control and target markets are 5 percent and 40 percent respectively. If the share in the control market 
increases to 10 percent, then the logit structure would dictate that the predicted share in the target market would be 
65 percent. If the share increased to “only” 60 percent, the regression would report a negative acquisition effect, a 
result driven entirely by functional form. Note that this problem is potentially endemic in Huckman (2006). 
 
17 The first years are 1994 and 1995 in Florida and New York, respectively. If the acquirer began offering open-heart 
surgery after the first year, we define the year that they started offering the service as the first year for the 
CABG/PTCA estimation.   14 
considered close, the market share in the control zip code must be within a certain range of the 
share in the target zip code, with the range depending on the initial share in the target market (see 
Figure 3). We apply a more refined matching criterion to selecting control markets for the 
tertiary DRG sample because that sample contains nearly ten times as many observations.
18 
 
3.3 Treatments and Diagnoses Studied 
We conduct the analysis on two sets of procedures: highly profitable CABG/PTCA 
procedures, and a broader set of “tertiary” DRGs, which we defined as DRGs that (1) were 
notably more likely to be performed at large hospitals than small hospitals,
19 and (2) had a 
Medicare case-weight of at least .50.
20 Appendix A lists the 36 DRGs we classify as tertiary; note 
that this set includes both CABG and PTCA. 
3.4 Selective Referral Hypotheses 
  We test the three referral hypotheses by assessing whether changes in referral patterns are 
the same for all affected patients. Specifically, we examine whether referral patterns vary 
systematically by treatment (i.e., cardiac versus broader tertiary diagnoses), payer type, and 
expected treatment costs.  
                                                 
 
18 See Appendix C for a comparison of the acquisition effects estimated using only the matched control zip codes to 
the acquisition effects estimated using all candidate control zip codes (with both models estimated using a linear 
probability model). That both models yield similar results is evidence that the results are not driven by sample 
selection bias in our control zip code selection algorithm.  
 
19 We classified hospitals with over 500 beds as large and hospitals with under 100 beds as small. We then identified 
DRGs such that (i) the percentage of patients in that DRG admitted to small hospitals was below 5% and the 
percentage admitted to large hospitals exceeded 10%, or (ii) the percentage admitted to small hospitals was both 
below 10% and less than half the percentage admitted to large hospitals. To avoid potential sample selection biases, 
we used 1997 Arizona data to identify our set of tertiary DRGs. Finally, we omitted DRGs with fewer than 500 
observations statewide. 
 
20 The Medicare caseweight reflects the average cost of treating a patient in a given DRG. The patient-weighted 
average caseweight across all DRGs is about 1.2.    15 
We do not have an ideal metric for expected treatment costs. We consider two proxies: 
list charges and the number of diagnoses (diagnoses are only reported in New York). List charges 
are derived from the services provided to patients and each hospital’s “charge master,” a 
comprehensive catalog of a hospital’s list prices for every individual service. Accordingly, 
Medicare patients within a given DRG who consume a great deal of resources will have high list 
charges but the same reimbursement as other patients in the same DRG, making them less 
profitable.
21 The same applies to many HMO patients. The number of reported diagnoses is also 
an imperfect measure of costs; in general, however, patients in a given DRG with more reported 
diagnoses have more complications and require more intensive care (Muñoz et al. 1988). 
 
4. Estimation 
4.1 Acquirer Share Effects 
For each acquisition, we estimate logit models  of hospital choice separately for 
CABG/PTCA patients and for tertiary patients. We use discharge data from 1995 to 2000 for the 
state of New York and 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 for the state of Florida. The dependent 
variable Y equals 1 if the patient chose the acquirer and 0 otherwise. The logit regression model, 
which we estimate using all patients in the target and control markets, is: 






















.  (1) 
                                                 
 
21 Medicare, like most private insurers that use case rates, has outlier provisions under which particularly expensive 
cases are reviewed and payments may be increased. For Medicare, such outlier payments accounted for between 5 
and 7.5 percent of total Medicare inpatient spending and well under 5 percent of discharges in our sample (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, 2002).   16 
Yeart is a vector of year fixed effects, Xi is a vector of demographic and clinical characteristics of 
patient i, Di is the driving time from i's zip code to the acquirer, Ti is a dummy variable indicating 
whether i lives in the target market, and TAi is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the patient 
belongs to the target group and the time is after the acquisition. If the coefficient on the last 
explanatory variable, TA b , is positive and statistically different from zero, then the acquisition 
increased referrals.  
We estimate (1) separately for each acquisition. We control for the patient’s age, payer 
type, the type of cardiac treatment or the major disease category (for cardiac services and tertiary 
services regressions respectively), and whether the patient had an acute myocardial infarction 
(AMI, for cardiac services regression only). We also include three indicator variables,  Ei, that 
measure the following events: patient i's zip code was affected by the entry of a new inpatient 
provider of CABG/PTCA services, i's zip code was affected by a hospital exiting from tertiary 
care; or i's zip code was included in multiple target markets. Given this structure, if an acquirer’s 
share increases post-acquisition by the same amount in both the target and control markets, then 
the corresponding year-effects will be positive while  ßTA will be zero.
22 Conversely, if the 
increased share is greater in the area surrounding the target hospital, then ßTA will be positive and 
we attribute the increase to the acquisition.  
Endogeneity can be a concern with approaches such as this one. For example, acquirers 
could purchase community hospitals in those areas with favorable demographic and clinical 
trends that are not captured in our data. While we cannot definitively rule out this possibility, two  
                                                 
 
22 Any change in referrals resulting from a change in quality at the acquiring hospital should be captured by changes 
in referrals from the control population. Huckman (2006) pools his data, with acquisitions occurring at different 
points in time, and thereby is unable to control for each hospital’s own admissions trend.    17 
factors lessen our concern. First, we focus on shares of patients rather than absolute numbers. 
Unobserved trends that increase the propensity of residents in the target market to undergo 
CABG/PTCA or tertiary procedures would increase admissions to all tertiary hospitals drawing 
from that high growth area, not just the acquirer. Second, we do control for several demographic 
and clinical characteristics of the target and control populations.  
We explored several options for selecting the time period that defines  TA. Hospital 
consolidations are usually consummated within months of announcement, but some take longer. 
It is conceivable that admission patterns could change prior to consolidation if, for example the 
acquirer had already begun courting physicians. Accordingly, we tried three different model 
specifications. In the first specification, TA = 1 for patients in the target market from the year of 
the acquisition announcement through all subsequent periods. In the second specification, TA = 1 
from one year before the acquisition through all subsequent periods. In the third specification, 
which we focus on in this paper, we set TA = 1 in the years following the announcement year and 
also include a second interaction for the “between period” consisting of the prior year and actual 
year of the acquisition.
23 Our results are broadly consistent across all specifications. 
 
4.2 Selective Referral Effects and Patient Severity 
To identify selective referral effects based on patient severity, we compare the 
distribution of list charges of Medicare and HMO patients who reside in the target market and 
are admitted to the acquiring hospital, to Medicare and HMO patients admitted to the acquirer  
                                                 
 
23 Thus, our reported TA coefficients compare the referral probabilities from a time at least one year before the 
merger to the post-merger period rather than comparing the post-merger period to the entire pre-merger period, 
which likely includes some transitory effects caused by the merger itself.   18 
from the control markets, before and after the acquisition. We use the same approach to study the 
effect of the acquisition on the number of diagnosis of Medicare and HMO patients admitted 
from the target market. both before and after the acquisition. For both diagnoses and charges, we 
are again interested in the coefficient on TAi, the indicator for target market patients in the post-
acquisition period. We also interact TAi with an HMO dummy to allow the effects to differ by 
payer type.  
We estimate quantile regressions (see Appendix B) for list charges in order to focus on 
the patients who are most readily identifiable as unprofitable (the upper end of the list charge 
distribution) or profitable (the lower end of the charges distribution). Because the number of 
diagnoses is a count variable, we are unable to estimate quantile regressions, so we instead 






For Florida, we use biannual discharge data from the Florida Agency for Health Care 
Administration (AHCA). For New York, we use annual discharge data from the Health Care 
Utilization Project (HCUP). Both data sets contain detailed clinical and demographic information 
for every hospital discharge. Clinical variables include the patient’s DRG, secondary diagnoses, 
and additional procedures. The non-clinical variables we use are age, payer type, and zip code; 
the latter allows us to identify patients in the target and control markets.  
Table 1 contains hospital summary statistics.
25 Whether measured by beds or inpatient 
days, the acquiring hospitals are over three times larger than targets in New York, and over twice 
                                                 
 
24 We also estimated Ordered Probit models and found similar results (available upon request).  
 
25 The number of targets exceeds the number of acquirers because some acquirers purchased more than one target.   19 
as large in Florida. Nearly all of the acquirers offer open heart surgery, while only one target in 
each state did so.
26 Similarly, none of the New York targets and only one of the Florida targets 
were teaching hospitals, whereas 25% of acquirers in New York and 70% in Florida were 
teaching hospitals. In both states the targets served a higher proportion of Medicare patients than 
did the acquirers.  
Table 2 contains patient summary statistics. The cardiac patients are significantly older 
than the tertiary patients. The CABG/PTCA group is also disproportionately white, and, not 
surprisingly given their average age, contains relatively few Medicaid patients. Within each 




6.1 Acquirer Share Effects 
  Before running regressions, we examined whether the average acquisition led to a larger 
share increase in the target market than in the control markets. Table 3 clearly shows that it did 
not. In fact, the change in the average acquirer’s market share in the target market is slightly 
below the corresponding change in the control markets, though the difference is not significant.
28 
                                                 
 
26 This seems like a discrepancy, as all acquirers should, by definition, offer open heart surgery. A hospital can 
perform a moderate number of CABG/PTCA procedures without the AHA categorizing it as offering open heart 
surgery. For instance, Crouse Hospital in Syracuse, NY is not classified as performing open heart surgery, but did 
perform 142 CABGs and PTCAs from 1995-2000. Leesburg Regional Hospital, a Florida target, began offering 
open heart surgery only after being acquired. 
 
27 The figures for the control and target groups in Table 2 are averages across all the acquisitions we study. Thus, any 
single acquisition would likely exhibit somewhat larger variation across the target and control groups.  
 
28 We also estimated the specifications in Huckman (2006) using our data and replicated his findings that 
acquisitions do lead, on average, to increases in referrals. This suggests that the difference between our findings is 
not due to the different time periods and hospitals studied.    20 
This is true for both the CABG/PTCA and the tertiary samples, and remains true when we 
control for year effects, state effects, or both.  
  While illustrative, the raw difference-in-difference estimates do not resolve the question 
of whether acquisitions increase referrals. First, while the average effect of an acquisition 
appears to be zero, examination of each individual acquisition reveals that a number of them did 
in fact lead to notable increases in the acquirer’s market share in the target market area (Figure 1 
contains one example). Second, for the simple estimator to yield an accurate estimate of the 
marginal impact of the acquisition, the changes in the acquirer’s market share in both the target 
and control markets must, absent the acquisition, be identical in expectation. This condition is 
unlikely to be met in the data, so a regression-adjusted estimator, as described in equation (1), is 
appropriate.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of our Logit regressions for CABG/PTCA patients and 
tertiary patients, respectively. We did not estimate regressions for a number of the acquisitions. 
Most of the unestimated acquisitions were dropped because the acquirer’s share was very small, 
below 5 percent, in both the pre- and post-periods; this primarily occurred when acquirer and 
target were very far apart. These are situations where very few patients in the target market ever 
choose the acquirer, suggesting these acquisitions were likely motivated by considerations other 
than referrals. We also dropped one case in the CABG/PTCA model in which the acquirer’s share 
was over 95% in both the pre- and post-period. In the remaining cases, unique geography or the 
presence of other hospitals around the acquirer prevented us from identifying a control market 
with sufficient observations. Thus, while we began  by considering 26 acquisitions, we only 
estimated the CABG/PTCA model for 13 acquisitions and the tertiary model for 15. These are   21 
the cases for which it is plausible that the acquisition was motivated by a desire to increase 
referrals and it was possible to perform a reliable analysis of whether this occurred. 
Table 4 shows that  TA b  is significant and positive in five of the thirteen CABG/PTCA 
models estimated. The column titled ‘Marginal Effect’ shows the corresponding increase in the 
probability of a target area resident choosing the acquiring hospital attributable to the 
acquisition.
29 For example, the acquisition of Amsterdam Memorial by Ellis Hospital increased 
Ellis’ share of CABG and PTCA patients in the area around Amsterdam Memorial by 40 percent, 
while North Shore Hospital nearly doubled its share in the area around Southside Hospital. Each 
of these increases represents over 100 additional CABG and PTCA patients annually. Based on 
the marginal profit numbers cited in Section  III, an additional 100 such patients increases 
hospital profits by roughly $500,000. Across all hospitals that saw a significant effect (all of 
which are positive), the average increase in market share in the target area was 10 percentage 
points (7 points if the average is patient-weighted).  
Table 5 shows that 10 of the 15 estimated acquisitions had a significant effect on the 
acquirer’s share of tertiary patients in the target market, and 7 of those 10 had a positive effect. 
(The greater number of significant results in these models largely reflects the larger sample 
sizes.) Two of the acquisitions with negative effects in this case also had negative, but 
insignificant effects in the CABG/PTCA sample.
30  As posited under the procedure-based 
                                                 
 
29 This is computed as 
,,, (|, Market=T, t=Post, TA=1)-(|, Market=T, t=Pre, TA=0). ititiit EYXEYX  Because we 
include patient demographics in the Logit model, the value of this expectation depends on the patient characteristics 
we use to compute it. We use a 65 year old Medicare patient in a zip code not affected by any of the events in E. 
Note that the marginal effects are equivalent to point increases in expected market share.  
 
30 These are the acquisition of South Seminole Hospital by Orlando Regional and the Rochester, NY acquisition of 
Highland Hospital by Strong Memorial. We are not sure why these hospitals lost share in their target markets; it is 
possible that a rival hospital situated closer to the target than to the control increased its quality, or the acquisition 
may have been poorly executed.   22 
selective referral hypothesis, the effects for tertiary DRGs, which generally have lower margins, 
are smaller in magnitude than in the higher margin CABG/PTCA sample. Acquirers whose 
market share did increase in the target market saw their market share increase by an average of 
4.2 points.  
  A related question is whether the additional admissions constitute an aggregate increase 
in market share or simply a reallocation of patients from the target to the acquirer. By definition, 
the referral effects we find for CABG and PTCA represent new business, because we are 
studying the acquisition of community hospitals that do not offer CABG/PTCA by tertiary 
hospitals that do. In the broader context of tertiary DRGs, the post-acquisition changes in the 
combined share of the acquirer and target within the target market are somewhat smaller than the 
corresponding increase for just the acquirer, but still positive. Thus, while there is some business-
shifting, there is still a net increase in volume. For example, the average increase in tertiary 
market share (in the target market) for both the acquirer and target is 0.33% while the 
corresponding figure for the acquirer alone is 0.89%.  
 
6.2 Selective Referral Effects 
  As previously discussed, sophisticated acquirers may seek to increase referrals of patients 
in proportion to the generosity of their insurers, the profitability of the treatment, and the severity 
of the patients. Tables 6 and 7 present the marginal effects of acquisition separately for each of 
the four payer categories used in  the estimation: FFS/PPO, Medicare, HMO, and Medicaid/ 
Indigent. With two exceptions, the acquisitions that have significant effects for at least one payer 
class also have significant overall referral effects.    23 
  Table 8 summarizes these findings, along with the earlier results. The majority of 
acquisitions led to no significant change in referrals from the target market. However, among 
those cases in which there was a significant change, the effect was more often positive than 
negative. The average estimates of  TA b  across all acquisitions are 0.2320 for CABG/PTCA and -
0.0076 for tertiary patients. If we assume that each market is an observation from a common 
process, we cannot reject the null that the average effect on tertiary referrals is zero (t = -.29). 
However, we do reject the null that the average effect on CABG/PTCA referrals is zero (t = 3.34).  
Turning to selective referral effects, we observe that there are many positive significant 
referral effects for Medicare patients and  few negative effects. In contrast, the few positive 
effects for Medicaid are largely offset by negative effects. These findings are consistent with 
selective referrals by payer. On the other hand, there is no apparent difference in the number of 
positive versus negative referral effects for relatively profitable FFS/PPO patients as compared to 
relatively less profitable HMO patients, though the magnitudes of positive effects are larger for 
FFS/PPO patients. Turning to treatment types, we find that 8 out of 9 significant referral effects 
for CABG/PTCA are positive, compared with 7 of 13 for tertiary (excluding CABG/PTCA). On 
balance, these patterns are consistent with selective referrals by profitability.  
Tables 9 and 10 show the average effect of each merger on the log of list charges, as well 
as the effects on the .10, .25, .50, .75, and .90 deciles of list charges for CABG/PTCA and 
tertiary patients, respectively. If acquirers screen based on severity, then we expect the post-
acquisition distribution of charges at the acquirer (for patients from the target area) to have more 
mass at the low end and less at the high end. Note that we are maintaining our difference-in-
difference approach in this specification, so we are comparing the post-acquisition distribution of   24 
charges for admissions from the target area to the distribution of admissions from the control 
area. This also controls for any changes in the acquirer’s prices following the acquisition. 
None of the results for CABG/PTCA patients with HMO insurance are significant, 
indicating an absence of severity-based selective referral patterns for these patients. For 
Medicare patients, many of the effects are significant, but varied. Overall, they are inconsistent 
with the selective referral hypothesis. While  two acquisitions saw, as expected, a significant 
decrease in the cutoff for the .10 decile of log charges, six entailed increases, meaning that 
referrals of the least severely ill patients decreased (relative to referrals of such patients in the 
control markets).
31  The results for the most severe Medicare CABG/PTCA patients also 
contradict the hypothesis: five acquirers significantly increased admissions of severely ill 
patients, and none decreased such admissions.  
In the broader category of tertiary DRGs, shown in Table 10, the picture is similar. None 
of the HMO effects are significant. If anything, we find fairly strong evidence of decreased, not 
increased, admissions of lower list charges patients. We also find five of six acquisitions with 
significant effects lead to increases in the number of admissions of Medicare patients with very 
high list charges. Based on this evidence, we cannot conclude that the acquirers are screening 
Medicare tertiary patients based on their severity.  
Turning to our second measure of severity, the number of diagnoses (Table 11), we again 
find evidence that contradicts the hypothesis of selective referrals based on severity. As was the 
case with list charges, none of the acquisitions had a significant effect on the number of 
                                                 
31 Note that a negative coefficient for the .10 or .25 quantile indicates increased admissions of low-severity patients 
(because the cut-off, X, such that 10% or 25% of patients have list charges below X shifts to the left post-
acquisition.) Conversely, for quantiles above the median, a positive coefficient indicates a rightward shift in the 
corresponding cutoff, indicating more admissions of high severity patients.  
   25 
diagnoses of HMO patients, whether CABG/PTCA or tertiary patients, referred from the target 
market. Only one acquisition was followed by a significant decrease in the number of diagnoses 
of referred Medicare CABG/PTCA patients (relative to patients admitted from the control area). 
Three acquisitions had significant increases. Otherwise, the results are insignificant.  
For Medicare patients within the broader set of tertiary DRGs, the effects are significant 
for about half of the acquisitions, but in six of those nine instances, the effect on the number of 
diagnoses of referred patients is positive rather than negative. Thus, both our examination of list 
charges and our examination of the number of diagnoses for patients referred from the target area 
fail to support the hypothesis of severity-based selective referrals. If anything, some acquirers 
may have increased admissions of more severely ill patients from the target area.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Hospital managers usually cite two factors when explaining their motivation for 
purchasing an outlying community hospital: improving quality at the target and increasing 
referrals to the acquirer. In this paper, we study the second motivation.
32 Our results indicate that 
only a minority of acquisitions lead to increases in referrals from the target market, relative to 
trend.
33 This finding is consistent with the broader strategy literature on mergers and acquisitions, 
which indicates that while some firms consistently succeed at acquisitions, the returns to 
acquisitive firms lag the market (Damodaran 2004).  
                                                 
32 Other studies, such as Capps (2005) and Sari (2002), examine whether acquisitions led to higher quality, generally 
finding no significant effect. See Town and Vogt (2006) for a review of the literature on acquisitions and quality.  
 
33 Nakamura (2006) studies why some acquisitions are more successful in increasing referrals than others and finds 
that referrals are likely to increase when the acquirer does not face capacity constraints and the target faces little 
competition. Even absent those conditions, however, an acquisition could be justified if the hospitals are close 
competitors in non-tertiary care or substantial efficiencies, perhaps from clinical integration or improved 
management, are likely.   26 
We study several mechanisms by which a sophisticated acquirer might increase the 
profitability of a new stream of patients from the target market, as compared to simply increasing 
referrals across-the-board. The acquirer could focus on increasing referrals of patients 
undergoing particularly profitable procedures, patients with more generous insurance, or 
relatively healthy patients (who have lower expected costs of care). When we focus our attention 
on hospitals that successfully increase referrals, we find that they do so in ways consistent with 
the first two selection mechanisms. However, we find no evidence of selection based on severity.  
The increase in referrals could improve welfare if the acquirers are superior in quality. 
The acquisition and subsequent change in referrals could also increase quality if the resulting 
consolidation of surgical volume facilitates learning economies. Huckman (2006) reports that 
there is no statistical significant change in the mortality rate in the entire state of New York after 
the wave of vertical integration. That analysis may be too broad, however, to identify effects in 
the fraction of acquisitions that resulted in changes in referral patterns. Integration could also 
harm patients by directing them to hospitals that would not select, based on location or other 
idiosyncratic reasons, absent the acquisitions.  
The evidence of selective referrals is also potentially disturbing. Unless vertical 
integration creates efficiencies or improves outcomes  – both of which have been hard to 
document in the literature – then integration is a zero sum game at best. The fact that some 
acquiring hospitals can increase profits through selective referrals implies that others will suffer 
losses. Hospitals  with a worsening payer mix may have to reduce staffing and make other 
choices that threaten quality. They may also feel obliged to find their own targets, leading to a 
kind of market Balkanization in which patients face increasing restrictions on their choice of 
tertiary care hospital.    27 
 Appendices 
 
Table A1. Tertiary DRGs 




DRG  Description 
Case-
weight  Acq.  Targ.  Acq.  Targ. 
1  CRANIOTOMY AGE >17 EXCEPT FOR TRAUMA  3.10  87%  17%  2,690  310 
10  NERVOUS SYSTEM NEOPLASMS W CC  1.20  78%  27%  877  386 
18  CRANIAL & PERIPHRL NERV DISORDERS W CC  0.94  57%  20%  544  325 
75  MAJOR CHEST PROCEDURES  3.11  91%  40%  1,922  506 
76  OTHER RESP SYSTEM O.R. PROCEDURES W CC  2.72  83%  50%  1,022  712 
104  CARD VLV/OTR CARDITHOR O.R. W CARD CATH  7.24  74%  3%  1,893  35 
105  CARD VLV/OTR CARDITHOR O.R. W/O CAR CATH  5.66  70%  0%  1,632  1 
106  OTH PERM PACM IMPL/PTCA W COR STNT IMPLT  7.33  78%  0%  5,607  0 
107  CORONARY BYPASS WITH CARDIAC CATH  5.46  74%  0%  4,553  0 
110  MAJOR CARDIOVASC. PROCS.W CC  4.16  87%  33%  2,211  441 
112  PERCUTANEOUS CARDIOVASC. PROCS.  1.92  87%  10%  13,919  196 
116  OTH PERM PACM IMPL/PTCA W ART STNT IMPLT  2.47  96%  63%  2,473  1,009 
120  OTHER CIRC. SYSTEM O.R. PROCs.  2.01  87%  37%  994  794 
124  CIRC DISOR EX AMI W CARD CATH & CMPLX DX  1.40  96%  43%  6,009  2,040 
125  CIRC DIS EX AMI W CARD CATH W/O CMPLX DX  1.04  96%  40%  5,281  739 
144  OTHER CIRCULATORY SYSTEM DIAG W CC  1.15  96%  53%  2,202  839 
257  TOTAL MASTECTOMY FOR MALIGNANCY W CC  0.91  74%  23%  803  369 
290  THYROID PROCEDURES  0.92  78%  17%  1,025  326 
315  OTHR KIDNEY/URINARY TRACT O.R. PROCS  2.07  78%  30%  1,007  550 
331  OTHR KIDNY/URINARY TRCT DIAG AGE>17 W CC  1.02  74%  23%  1,100  424 
358  UTERINE/ADNEX PR FOR NON-MALIG. W CC  1.24  91%  73%  3,215  1,537 
360  VAGINA, CERVIX &VULVA PROCEDURES  0.88  57%  7%  592  239 
370  CESAREAN SECTION W CC  1.10  87%  57%  4,385  1,574 
371  CESAREAN SECTION W/O CC  0.72  87%  63%  9,112  6,725 
372  VAGINAL DELIVERY W COMPLICATING DIAGS  0.59  87%  53%  5,397  1,982 
376  POSTPARTUM/POST ABORT DIAG WO O.R. PROC  0.53  65%  20%  630  361 
383  OTHR.  ANTEPARTUM DIAG W MED COMP.  0.53  87%  60%  3,461  2,103 
386  EXTREME IMMATURITY/RESP DIS SYN NEONATE  4.54  61%  17%  1,179  391 
387  PREMATURITY W MAJOR PROBLEMS  3.10  74%  20%  1,754  505 
388  PREMATURITY W/O MAJOR PROBLEMS  1.87  87%  43%  1,870  735 
389  FULL TERM NEONATE W MAJOR PROBLEMS  1.84  87%  60%  5,207  2,795 
390  NEONATE W OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS  1.60  87%  57%  7,585  3,468 
395  RED BLOOD CELL DISORDERS AGE >17  0.82  96%  63%  2,467  1,644 
403  LYMPHOMA/NON-ACUTE LEUKEMIA W CC  1.72  70%  33%  1,015  499 
410  CHEMO. WO ACUTE LEUKEMIA SEC DIAG  0.90  91%  57%  9,844  2,007 
442  OTHER O.R. PROCEDURES FOR INJURIES W CC  2.25  57%  7%  565  222 
466  AFTERCARE W/O HISTORY MALIGNCY SEC DIAG  0.71  13%  0%  302  44 
478  OTHER VASCULAR PROCEDURES W CC  2.35  96%  67%  3,384  1,447 
483  TRACHEOSTOMY EXCEPT FACE/MOUTH/NECK   16.12  91%  43%  1,804  710 
486  OTHER O.R. PROC MULT SIGNIFICANT TRAUMA  4.90  22%  0%  339  40 
500  BACK/NECK PROC EXCPT SPINAL FUSION WO CC  0.98  0  0  0  0 
Note: Hospitals treating at least 20 patients in a DRG are defined as "offering" that service. 
Source: 1994 Florida discharge data and 1995 New York discharge data.  
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Appendix B. A Quantile Model 
Let C denote total list charges for a patient admitted to the acquiring hospital: 
  iii CX be =+ . 

























The estimator is  










Øø =--<- ºß ￿
¡
, 
The first term in brackets equals .9 when (Charges>Xß) and equals (-.1) when (Charges< Xß), so 
the entire sum to be minimized consists of all positive numbers, as indicated by analogy to the 
Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) estimator for the median. The minimization above adjusts the 
betas to increase Xß if C exceeds more than 90% of the Xß’s, and vice-versa if C is smaller than 
90% of the Xß’s. For example, at  (90)
ˆ b , 90% of the residuals, e = Charges – Xß will be positive 
and 10% will be negative.  
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Appendix C. Linear Probability Model Results  
 
To examine potential selection bias stemming from our algorithm for selecting control zip codes, 
we also estimate the acquisition effects (
LPM
TA b ) using a linear probability model (LPM) and all 
potential control zip codes. For comparison, we also estimate the same linear probability models 
using the same control zip codes as in the primary Logit estimations. When we use all potential 
zip codes, we obtain larger and more significant coefficients in several markets. However, the 
general pattern remains that there are more positive than negative significant effects.  
 
Table A2. Linear Probability Model Results: All Potential Controls and Selected Controls 
     
LPM
TA b  Estimates 
      CABG/PTCA  Tertiary 












 Zip Codes 
FL  Halifax   Bert Fish  -0.054*  -0.092***   0.026   0.050*** 
FL  Orlando Reg.  Parrish  [a]  -0.081***  -0.013  -0.026*** 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  -0.048   0.051  -0.177  -0.179*** 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff   0.059**   0.052***   0.037***   0.051*** 
NY  Crouse Hosp.   Community Gen.  [b]  [b]   0.004   0.011 
NY  Ellis Hosp.   Amsterdam    0.236***   0.472***   0.043**   0.089*** 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens   -0.007   0.010  -0.009***  -0.039*** 
NY  North Shore Univ.  Southside   0.083***   0.101***   0.039***   0.061*** 
NY  NYU  Downtown  [a]  -0.017   0.011  -0.018** 
NY  Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  [c]  [c]   0.066**   0.145*** 
NY  St. Francis   Mercy MC   0.040   0.037   0.016**   0.042*** 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland   -0.072  -0.100***  -0.018  -0.050*** 
NY  United Health  Delaware Valley   [a]  [a]   0.025   0.098*** 
NY  Winthrop Univ.   Mid-Island   0.018   0.076***  -0.004   0.022*** 
NY  Winthrop Univ.   South Nassau    0.001   0.006   0.011**   0.018*** 
FL  Morton Plant   North Bay   [a]  -0.028  [a]  -0.027** 
FL  Orlando Reg.  Leesburg Reg.  [d]  [d]  [b]  [b] 
FL  University Comm.  Helen Ellis  [b]  [b]  [b]  [b] 
NY  New York Hosp  Little Neck  [b]  [b]  [b]  [b] 
NY  New York Hosp  Wyckoff Heights    0.006   0.006  [b]  [b] 
NY  North Shore Univ.  Staten   [b]  [b]  [b]  [b] 
NY  NY Presb.  Brooklyn   -0.020   0.007  [b]  [b] 
NY  St. Francis   Good Sam. Hosp.  [b]  [b]  [b]  [b] 
NY  St. Francis  Good Sam. MC   0.058**   0.062**  [a]   0.005 
NY  St. Francis   St. Charles   [a]  -0.004  [b]  [b] 
NY  St. Luke’s   Long Island   [b]  [b]  [b]  [b] 
    # Positive  4  5  6  9 
    # Negative  1  3  1  5 
    # Insignificant  8  9  8  2 
    Not Defined  13  9  11  10 
[a] Fewer than 200 observations in control market.  
[b] Acquirer’s share in target market below 5% before and after acquisition. 
[c] Acquirer’s share in target market above 95% before and after acquisition. 
[d] Leesburg Regional Hospital began offering CABG and PTCA shortly after being acquired. 
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Figure 1: Two Representative Acquisitions 
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Figure 3: Criteria for Matching Target and Control Zip Codes 
 
CABG & PTCA  Tertiary DRGs 
Acquirer's Share In The 
Target Market Is 
Maximum Share 
Difference 
Acquirer's Share In The 
Target Market Is 
Maximum Share 
Difference 
> 5%  0.050  > 40%  0.10 
< 5%  0.025  30% to 40%  0.08 
    20% to 30%  0.06 
    10% to 20%  0.04 
    5% to 10%  0.02 
    <5%  0.01 
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Table 1. Hospital Summary Statistics 
  Florida 
  Acquirers (N=5)
  Targets (N=6) 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Government  0.25  0.45  0.29  0.46 
Non-Profit  0.75  0.45  0.46  0.51 
For-Profit  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.44 
COTH  0.25  0.45  0.00  0.00 
Open Heart  0.88  0.34  0.08  0.28 
Beds  662.06  310.75  203.00  104.39 
Admissions  30,607  15,573  7,690  3,371 
IP Days - Total  146,220  75,926  41,415  26,925 
IP Days - Medicare  57,150  22,726  23,961  14,519 
IP Days - Medicaid  20,976  15,420  6,403  8,975 
  New York 
  Acquirers (N=14)  Targets (N=20) 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Government  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Non-Profit  1.00  0.00  0.95  0.22 
For-Profit  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.22 
COTH  0.71  0.46  0.10  0.31 
Open Heart  0.88  0.33  0.05  0.22 
Beds  777.09  535.12  304.77  162.47 
Admissions  32,057  18,079  12,391  7,583 
IP Days - Total  235,062  154,047  84,973  47,924 
IP Days -Medicare  89,719  46,570  38,196  21,126 
IP Days - Medicaid  48,209  48,538  19,669  17,742 
Notes: 
1.  Acquirers outnumber targets due to several acquirers acquiring multiple 
hospitals. 
2.  Averages are computed using the entire sample period.  
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Table 2. Patient Summary Statistics 
  New York 
  CABG/PTCA  Tertiary DRGs 
  Control  Target  Control  Target 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Medicare  0.491  0.250  0.482  0.250  0.241  0.183  0.229  0.177 
Uninsured  0.025  0.024  0.023  0.022  0.049  0.047  0.055  0.052 
Medicaid  0.096  0.087  0.090  0.082  0.307  0.213  0.298  0.209 
Fee for Service  0.122  0.107  0.120  0.106  0.119  0.105  0.133  0.115 
Blue Cross  0.121  0.107  0.128  0.112  0.113  0.100  0.124  0.108 
HMO  0.144  0.124  0.157  0.132  0.170  0.141  0.162  0.136 
White  0.686  0.215  0.702  0.209  0.398  0.240  0.459  0.248 
Black  0.045  0.043  0.068  0.064  0.232  0.178  0.276  0.200 
Hispanic  0.050  0.048  0.058  0.055  0.141  0.121  0.112  0.099 
Other race  0.114  0.101  0.071  0.066  0.144  0.123  0.107  0.095 
Unknown race  0.106  0.094  0.101  0.091  0.084  0.077  0.046  0.044 
Female  0.298  0.209  0.318  0.217  0.636  0.231  0.634  0.232 
Age  66.440  11.030  65.410  10.920  40.40  27.280  39.750  26.800 
#Procedure  6.407  3.356  6.438  3.457  2.722  2.539  2.807  2.584 
#Diagnoses  6.685  3.406  6.649  3.382  4.730  2.935  4.719  2.938 
 
  Florida 
  CABG/PTCA  Tertiary DRGs 
  Control  Target  Control  Target 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Medicare  0.514  0.250  0.574  0.244  0.354  0.229  0.399  0.240 
Uninsured  0.037  0.035  0.032  0.031  0.046  0.044  0.039  0.037 
Medicaid  0.018  0.017  0.016  0.016  0.173  0.143  0.136  0.117 
Fee for Service  0.126  0.110  0.088  0.080  0.115  0.102  0.113  0.100 
PPO  0.110  0.098  0.141  0.121  0.136  0.117  0.144  0.123 
HMO  0.195  0.157  0.149  0.127  0.176  0.145  0.170  0.141 
White  0.934  0.062  0.929  0.066  0.781  0.171  0.864  0.117 
Black  0.019  0.019  0.022  0.021  0.100  0.090  0.071  0.066 
Hispanic  0.022  0.022  0.019  0.019  0.083  0.076  0.034  0.033 
Other race  0.012  0.012  0.011  0.011  0.021  0.020  0.015  0.015 
Unknown race  0.012  0.012  0.019  0.018  0.015  0.014  0.016  0.016 
Female  0.310  0.214  0.324  0.219  0.573  0.245  0.563  0.246 
Age  65.260  11.140  66.050  11.320  46.130  27.750  48.740  27.260 
Notes: 
1.  In New York, PPO patients are not separately identified from FFS patients.  
2.  In Florida, Blue Cross patients are not separately identified from other PPO patients. 
3.  Florida does not record the number of procedures or the number of diagnoses. 
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Table 3. Raw Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
  Average (?Share
Target – ?Share
Control) 
  Sample (N = 26) 
Model  CABG/PTCA  Tertiary 
-0.0252  -0.0125 
No Year Effects  
(0.0562)  (0.0275) 
-0.0252  -0.0125 
Year Effects 
(0.0550)  (0.0275) 
-0.0252  -0.0125 
Year & State Effects 
(0.0544)  (0.0275) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Acquisition Effects for CABG/PTCA Referrals, All Payers 







Pre-Acq.  TA b  
Marginal 
Effect 
FL  Halifax   Bert Fish  2,271  1,016  24%  -0.296   -0.031 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  5,634  598  12%  -0.357  -0.031 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  3,499  1,534  85%   0.778***   0.046*** 
NY  Ellis Hosp.   Amsterdam   1,017  534  51%   0.498***   0.311*** 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens   5,875  887  16%  -0.061  -0.004 
NY  New York Hosp.  Wyckoff Heights   3,042  7,620  0%   0.707**   0.025** 
NY  North Shore Univ.   Southside  2,147  10,101  8%   0.811***   0.071*** 
NY  NY Presb.  Brooklyn   5,152  4,257  10%  -0.187  -0.014 
NY  St. Francis   Good Sam. MC  3,330  1,802  27%   0.274**   0.061** 
NY  St. Francis   Mercy MC  3,267  278  59%   0.170   0.037 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland   1,492  225  22%  -0.424  -0.078 
NY  Winthrop Univ.   Mid-Island  3,241  1,129  27%   0.082   0.018 
NY  Winthrop Univ.   South Nassau   3,517  10,628  8%   0.006   0.000 
FL  Morton Plant
+  North Bay            
FL  Orlando Reg.
‡  Leesburg Reg.           
FL  Orlando Reg.
+  Parrish           
FL  University Comm.
++  Helen Ellis           
NY  Crouse Hosp.
++   Community Gen.           
NY  New York Hosp.
++  Little Neck           
NY  North Shore Univ.
++   Staten            
NY  NYU
+  Downtown           
NY  Rochester Gen.
+++  Myers Comm.           
NY  St. Francis
++  Good Sam. Hosp.           
NY  St. Francis
+  St. Charles            
NY  St. Luke’s
++  Long Island            
NY  United Health
+  Delaware Valley            
TA b  is the estimated Logit coefficient on the indicator for the post-acquisition target group.  
Marginal Effect = ,,, (|, Market=T, t=Post)-(|, Market=T, t=Pre). ititiit EYXEYX  This is evaluated at 
the median of all continuous variables and the modal value of all discrete variables. 
+ Control Market not definable. 
++ Acquirer’s share in target market below 5%, before and after acquisition.  
+++ Acquirer’s share in target market above 95%, before and after acquisition.  
‡ Leesburg Regional Hospital began offering CABG and PTCA shortly after being acquired. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 5. Acquisition Effects for Tertiary Referrals, All Payers 







Pre-Acq.  TA b  
Marginal 
Effect 
FL  Halifax  Bert Fish  16,741  6,192  20%   0.203**   0.011** 
FL  Orlando Reg.  Parrish  23,713  12,094  8%  -0.413***  -0.010*** 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  40,775  8,344  16%  -1.571***  -0.166*** 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  38,765  22,877  49%   0.174***   0.038*** 
NY  Crouse Hosp.  Community Gen.  28,233  12,446  38%   0.0200   0.003 
NY  Ellis Hosp.  Amsterdam  9,548  442  21%   0.320**   0.079** 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  67,164  32,836  6%  -0.325***  -0.014*** 
NY  North Shore Univ.  Southside  31,907  68,093  5%   0.693***   0.049*** 
NY  NYU  Downtown  12,644  32,843  10%   0.129   0.013 
NY  Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  3,227  27,019  33%   0.335*   0.079* 
NY  St. Francis   Mercy MC  36,786  17,792  13%   0.125*   0.030* 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland  23,659  6,977  29%  -0.082  -0.017 
NY  United Health  Delaware Valley  7,593  484  21%   0.183   0.038 
NY  Winthrop Univ.  Mid-Island  39,624  14,282  19%  -0.027  -0.006 
NY  Winthrop Univ.  South Nassau  46,096  22,697  11%   0.124**   0.007** 
FL  Morton Plant
+   North Bay           
FL  Orlando Reg.
++  Leesburg Reg.           
FL  University Comm.
++ Helen Ellis           
NY  New York Hosp
++  Little Neck           
NY  New York Hosp
++  Wyckoff Heights           
NY  North Shore Univ.
++ Staten            
NY  NY Presb.
++  Brooklyn           
NY  St. Francis
+, ++  Good Sam. Hosp.           
NY  St. Francis
+  Good Sam. MC           
NY  St. Francis
+, ++  St. Charles           
NY  St. Luke’s
++   Long Island           
TA b  is the estimated Logit coefficient on the indicator for the post-acquisition target group.  
Marginal Effect = ,,, (|, Market=T, t=Post)-(|, Market=T, t=Pre). ititiit EYXEYX  This is evaluated at 
the median of all continuous variables and the modal value of all discrete variables. 
+ Control Market not definable. 
++ Acquirer’s share in target market below 5%, before and after acquisition.  
+++ Acquirer’s share in target market above 95%, before and after acquisition.  
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 6. Acquisition Marginal Effects by Payer Category, CABG/PTCA  




Control  FFS/PPO Medicare  HMO 
Medicaid/ 
Indigent 
FL  Halifax   Bert Fish  2,271  1,016  -0.008  -0.038  -0.0370  -0.035 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  5,634  598   0.004  -0.026  -0.076   0.001 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  3,499  1,534   0.080   0.047**   0.028   -- 
NY  Ellis  Amsterdam   1,017  534   0.343*   0.287***  0.423**   -- 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens   5,875  887  -0.021  -0.011  -0.005   0.019 
NY  New York Hosp  Wyckoff Heights   3,042  7,620   0.029   0.036**   0.022   0.034 
NY  North Shore Univ.   Southside  2,147  10,101   0.072**   0.041**   0.115**   0.037 
NY  NY Presb.  Brooklyn   5,152  4,257   0.040  -0.034*** -0.045   0.059 
NY  St. Francis  Mercy MC  3,267  278  -0.069   0.045   0.284***  0.151 
NY  St. Francis   Good Sam. MC  3,330  1,802  -0.028   0.068*   0.229**   0.097 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland   1,492  225   0.139  -0.094  -0.043  -0.201 
NY  Winthrop   Mid-Island  3,241  1,129   0.195*   0.019  -0.139   0.348 
NY  Winthrop   South Nassau   3,517  10,628   0.004  -0.006  -0.002   0.159** 
FL  Morton Plant
+  North Bay  
FL  Orlando Reg.
‡  Leesburg Reg. 
FL  Orlando Reg.
+  Parrish 
FL  University Comm.
++ Helen Ellis 
NY  Crouse
++  Community Gen. 
NY  New York Hosp
++  Little Neck 
NY  North Shore Univ.
++ Staten  
NY  NYU
+  Downtown 
NY  Rochester Gen.
+++  Myers Comm. 
NY  St. Francis
+  St. Charles  
NY  St. Francis
++  Good Sam. Hosp 
NY  St. Luke’s
++   Long Island  
NY  United Health















Marginal Effect = ,,, (|, Market=T, t=Post)-(|, Market=T, t=Pre). ititiit EYXEYX  This is evaluated at the 
indicated value of the payer variable, the median of all continuous variables and the modal value of 
other discrete variables. 
+ Control Market not definable. 
++ Acquirer’s share in target market below 5%, before and after acquisition.  
+++ Acquirer’s share in target market above 95%, before and after acquisition.  
‡ Leesburg Regional Hospital began offering CABG and PTCA shortly after being acquired. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 7. Acquisition Marginal Effects by Payer, Tertiary DRGs 




Control  FFS/PPO  Medicare  HMO 
Medicaid/ 
Indigent 
FL  Halifax  Bert Fish  16,741  6,192   0.026   0.020***   -0.005   0.012 
FL  Orlando Reg.  Parrish  23,713  12,094  -0.003*   0.013***    0.004  -0.008*** 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  40,775  8,344  -0.157***  -0.069***   -0.205***  -0.198*** 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  38,765  22,877   0.052   0.010   0.079  -0.208** 
NY  Crouse  Community Gen.  28,233  12,446   0.007   0.022*   -0.052   0.057 
NY  Ellis  Amsterdam  9,548  442   0.151   0.072*   -0.047   0.143 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  67,099  32,901  -0.030**  -0.011***   -0.018  -0.006 
NY  North Shore Univ.  Southside  31,927  68,073   0.060**   0.076***    0.060*   0.068** 
NY  NYU  Downtown  12,644  32,843   0.039   0.005  --  -0.017 
NY  Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  3,227  27,019   0.143   0.182***   -0.007  -0.085 
NY  St. Francis  Mercy MC  36,786  17,792  -0.042   0.047***    0.177**   0.083 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland  23,659  6,977   0.139*  -0.004  -0.072   0.011 
NY  United Health  Delaware Valley  7,593  484   0.120   0.108***    0.013  -0.045* 
NY  Winthrop  Mid-Island  39,624  14,282   0.087   0.029  -0.108**  -0.014 
NY  Winthrop  South Nassau  46,096  22,697   0.026*   0.014***   -0.012*   0.030* 
FL  Morton Plant
+  North Bay              
FL  Orlando Reg.
++  Leesburg Reg.             
FL  University Comm.
++ Helen Ellis             
NY  New York Hosp.
++  Little Neck             
NY  New York Hosp.
++  Wyckoff Heights              
NY  North Shore Univ.
++ Staten              
NY  NY Presb.
++  Brooklyn              
NY  St. Francis
++  Good Sam. Hosp.            
NY  St. Francis
+  Good Sam. MC             
NY  St. Francis
++  St. Charles              
NY  St. Luke’s
 ++   Long Island              
Marginal Effect = ,,, (|, Market=T, t=Post)-(|, Market=T, t=Pre). ititiit EYXEYX  This is evaluated at the 
indicated value of the payer variable, the median of all continuous variables and the modal value of other 
discrete variables. 
+ Control Market not definable. 
++ Acquirer’s share in target market below 5%, before and after acquisition.  
+++ Acquirer’s share in target market above 95%, before and after acquisition.  
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 8. Summary of Marginal Effects, by Payer Type 
  CABG/PTCA    Tertiary    Tertiary, Excluding CABG/PTCA 
Payer Class  > 0  < 0  = 0
(a)  Undef.
(b)    > 0  < 0  = 0
(a)  Undef.
(b)    > 0  < 0  = 0
(a)  Undef.
(b) 
FFS/PPO  3  0  17  6    3  3  18  2    4  3  17  2 
Medicare  5  1  14  6    9  2  13  2    6  2  16  2 
HMO  4  0  16  6    2  3  18  3    1  4  18  3 
Medicaid/Indigent  1  0  17  8    2  4  18  2    3  3  18  2 
  Any +  Any -  All 0  Undef.    Any +  Any -  All 0  Undef.    Any +  Any -  All 0  Undef. 
Total:  8  1  11  6    10  7  10  2    7  6  12  2 
Notes 
(a) Includes insignificant results as well as cases where the acquirer’s share was above 5% or below 95% both pre and post acquisition. 
 
(b) Includes instances where the control market was undefinable or where the particular payer-specific effect was not estimable. 
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Table 9. Quantile Regression Results: Acquisition Effects on CABG/PTCA List Charges 
            Cutoff values for the .10, .25, .50, .75, and .90 deciles 
            Medicare 






Effect  .10  .25  .50  .75  .90 
FL  Halifax  Bert Fish  675  275   0.129**  -0.005   0.073   0.194***   0.132   0.150 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  125  351  -0.090   0.109  -0.150  -0.104  -0.106  -0.094 
NY Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  3,202  2,282   0.059*  -0.044  -0.006  -0.011   0.039   0.240*** 
NY Ellis  Amsterdam  1,188  458   0.038  -0.013   0.004  -0.010  -0.007   0.142 
NY Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  312  335  -0.090  -0.382**  -0.065   0.015  -0.155  -0.012 
NY NY Presb.  Brooklyn  910  322   0.060  -0.224***  -0.019   0.115   0.256*   0.537** 
NY Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  5,432  261   0.067   0.150***   0.150***   0.101**   0.078  -0.095 
NY St. Francis  Good Sam. MC  960  677   0.149***   0.155***   0.111***   0.157***   0.162**   0.078 
NY St. Francis  Mercy MC  960  1,294   0.135***   0.168***   0.091***   0.063   0.089   0.200** 
NY St. Francis  St. Charles  926  334   0.087   0.014  -0.011   0.131**   0.211***   0.321** 
NY Strong Mem.  Highland  334  223   0.148   0.090   0.104   0.134**   0.206   0.250 
NY United Health  Delaware Valley  1,187  300   0.125*   0.189**   0.183***   0.103   0.115  -0.112 
NY Winthrop  Mid-Island  890  655   0.228***   0.147***   0.166***   0.212***   0.146*   0.383*** 
NY Winthrop  South Nassau  1,634  195   0.225***   0.217***   0.161**   0.205***   0.121   0.106 
     HMO 






Effect  .10  .25  .50  .75  .90 
FL  Halifax  Bert Fish  675  275   0.164   0.041   0.108   0.213   0.208   0.158 
FL  Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  125  351  -0.039   0.124  -0.042  -0.113   0.015  -0.139 
NY Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  3,202  2,282   0.037  -0.010   0.021   0.019   0.058   0.056 
NY Ellis  Amsterdam  1,188  458  -0.042  -0.039  -0.029   0.016   0.058   0.008 
NY Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  312  335   0.047  -0.245  -0.028   0.017  -0.014   0.057 
NY NY Presb.  Wyckoff Heights  698  114   0.271  --  --  --  --  -- 
NY Rochester Gen.  Brooklyn  910  322   0.086  -0.157   0.061   0.121   0.055   0.228 
NY St. Francis  Myers Comm.  5,432  261   0.180   0.195   0.202   0.102   0.213   0.029 
NY St. Francis  Good Sam. MC  960  677   0.037   0.108   0.059   0.037   0.036  -0.046 
NY St. Francis  Mercy MC  960  1,294   0.081   0.164   0.042   0.050   0.123   0.093 
NY Strong Mem.  St. Charles  926  334  -0.042  -0.013  -0.012  -0.014   0.017   0.029 
NY United Health  Highland  334  223   0.232  -0.052  -0.008   0.231   0.361   0.366 
NY Winthrop  Delaware Valley  1,187  300   0.059   0.005   0.134   0.072   0.174  -0.074 
NY Winthrop  Mid-Island  890  655   0.225   0.175   0.250   0.245   0.180   0.305 
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Table 10. Quantile Regression Results: Acquisition Effects on Tertiary List Charges 
 
Cutoff values for the 
.10, .25, .50, .75, and .90 deciles 
   Medicare 
St.  Acquirer  Target  # Cont.  # Targ. 
Mean 
Effect  .10  .25  .50  .75  .90 
FL Morton Plant   North Bay  4,523  1,131   0.145***   0.203***   0.179***   0.128***   0.116***   0.079 
FL Orlando Reg.  Parrish  4,610  221   0.117   0.145*   0.022   0.079   0.075  -0.002 
FL Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  4,004  491   0.122**   0.149**   0.069   0.144**   0.203***   0.172 
NY Buffalo Gen.  Columbus  1,663    189  -0.144  -0.021  -0.017  -0.135  -0.144  -0.210 
NY Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  14,833  14,212   0.066***   0.040*   0.072***   0.044***   0.055**   0.163*** 
NY Crouse  Community Gen.  3,829  4,977   0.058   0.141***   0.079***   0.062  -0.002  -0.070 
NY Ellis  Amsterdam  4,243  1,459  -0.081  -0.019  -0.029  -0.027   0.045  -0.074 
NY Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  6,028  3,008  -0.171***  -0.033  -0.005  -0.124**  -0.210***  -0.339*** 
NY New York Hosp  Little Neck  7,456  114   0.262   0.238   0.236   0.045   0.244   0.130 
NY New York Hosp  Wyckoff Heights  7,456  559   0.164**   0.166*   0.098   0.056   0.077   0.098 
NY North Shore Un. Southside  14,584  583   0.151   0.195***   0.137*   0.150*   0.140   0.166 
NY NYU  Downtown  2,146    612   0.216**   0.192*   0.200**   0.090  -0.005   0.240 
NY Strong Memorial Highland  4,044  3,950  -0.004   0.011   0.055   0.011   0.055   0.057 
NY NY Presb.  Brooklyn  9,500  1,864   0.096*   0.113**   0.152***   0.096**   0.100*   0.102 
NY Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  25,675  972  -0.010   0.038   0.019   0.034   0.009  -0.094 
NY United Health   Delaware Valley  6,900  1,061   0.214***   0.215***   0.245***   0.197***   0.226***   0.223** 
NY St. Francis   Good Sam. MC  3,915  1,927   0.077**   0.080**   0.091***   0.097**   0.163***   0.007 
NY St. Francis  Mercy MC  3,995  3,822   0.137***   0.136***   0.148***   0.137***   0.130***   0.128** 
NY St. Francis  St. Charles  3,915  1,295   0.081**   0.086**   0.049   0.055   0.093*   0.182** 
NY St. Luke’s  Long Island  5,199  186   0.120   0.275   0.337*   0.304***   0.017  -0.208 
NY Winthrop  Mid-Island  11,439  4,650   0.039   0.049   0.085***   0.000   0.014   0.180*** 
NY Winthrop  South Nassau  13,893  2,702   0.074**   0.174***   0.144***   0.092***  -0.005  -0.012 
          HMO 
FL Morton Plant   North Bay  4,523  1,131   0.179   0.260   0.226   0.136   0.183   0.146 
FL Orlando Reg.  Parrish  4,610  221   0.104  -0.172   0.028   0.109   0.107   0.145 
FL Orlando Reg.  South Seminole  4,004  491   0.188   0.195   0.124   0.203   0.260   0.200 
NY Buffalo Gen.  Columbus  1,663   189    0.097   0.210   0.134  -0.036  -0.117  -0.060 
NY Buffalo/  DeGraff  14,833  14,212   0.038  -0.000   0.034   0.036   0.035   0.103 
NY Crouse  Community Gen.  3,829  4,977  -0.026   0.009  -0.028  -0.003  -0.038  -0.051 
NY Ellis  Amsterdam  4,243  1,459  -0.017   0.011   0.049   0.032   0.089  -0.061 
NY Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  6,028  3,008  -0.019   0.043   0.032  -0.072  -0.041  -0.071 
NY New York Hosp  Little Neck  7,456  114   0.161   0.150   0.054   0.004   0.304   0.319 
NY New York Hosp  Wyckoff Heights  7,456  559   0.145   0.006   0.107   0.113   0.148   0.247 
NY North Shore Un. Southside  14,584  583   0.315   0.225   0.239   0.290   0.220   0.316 
NY NYU  Downtown  2,146  612   0.216  --  --  --  --  -- 
NY Strong Memorial Highland  4,044  3,950   0.015  -0.043  -0.017   0.043   0.094   0.138 
NY NY Presb.  Brooklyn  9,500  1,864   0.079   0.084   0.093   0.049   0.050   0.153 
NY Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  25,675  972   0.012   0.056   0.128   0.088   0.006  -0.054 
NY United Health   Delaware Valley  600  1,061   0.126   0.164   0.207   0.167   0.170   0.072 
NY St. Francis   Good Sam. MC  3,915  1,927   0.021  -0.006  -0.004   0.090   0.103   0.032 
NY St. Francis  Mercy MC  3,995  3,822   0.121   0.108   0.145   0.124   0.112   0.102 
NY St. Francis  St. Charles  3,915  1,295  -0.171  -0.108  -0.256  -0.104  -0.062   0.013 
NY St. Luke’s  Long Island  5,199  186   0.120  --  --  --  --  -- 
NY Winthrop  Mid-Island  11,439  4,650   0.207   0.112   0.138   0.160   0.190   0.205 
NY Winthrop  South Nassau  13,893  2,702   0.132   0.201   0.162   0.113   0.111   0.084 
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        Change in # Diagnoses 
          CABG/PTCA 
St.  Acquirer  Target  # Control 
#  
Target  Medicare  HMO 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  3,202  2,282  -0.102   0.015 
NY  Ellis  Amsterdam  1,188  458   1.795***   0.904 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  312  335   0.574   0.828 
NY  NY Presb.  Brooklyn  910  322   0.185  -0.349 
NY  Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  5,432  261   0.195   0.286 
NY  St. Francis  Good Sam. MC  960  677   0.410*  -0.152 
NY  St. Francis  Mercy MC  960  1,294   0.360**  -0.042 
NY  St. Francis  St. Charles  926  334   0.189  -0.093 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland  334  223   0.257   0.854 
NY  United Health  Delaware Valley  1,187  300  -0.604*  -0.887 
NY  Winthrop  Mid-Island  890  655   0.076   0.613 
NY  Winthrop  South Nassau  1,634  195   0.547*   0.052 
        Tertiary DRGs 
St.  Acquirer  Target  # Control  # Target  Medicare  HMO 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  Columbus  2,114  230   0.019  -0.539 
NY  Buffalo Gen.  DeGraff  15,151  14,472   0.130*   0.243 
NY  Crouse  Community Gen.  3,966  5,140   0.345***  -0.004 
NY  Ellis  Amsterdam  4,582  1,535   0.755***   0.603 
NY  Mt. Sinai/NYU  Western Queens  6,211  3,104   0.350**   0.592 
NY  New York Hosp  Little Neck  8,047  120  -0.337  -0.617 
NY  New York Hosp  Wyckoff Heights  8,047  593   0.325   0.395 
NY  North Shore Univ.  Southside  15,000  594  -0.198   0.102 
NY  NY Presb.  Brooklyn  9,738  1,912   0.280**   0.395 
NY  NYU  Downtown  2,370  655  -0.633***  -- 
NY  Rochester Gen.  Myers Comm.  26,255  990   0.250   0.302 
NY  St. Francis  Good Sam. MC  4,154  1,968  -0.134  -0.367 
NY  St. Francis  Mercy MC  4,170  3,912  -0.205*  -0.157 
NY  St. Francis  St. Charles  4,154  1,324   0.084  -0.352 
NY  St. Luke’s  Long Island  5,585  198   0.254  -- 
NY  Strong Memorial  Highland  4,149  4,055   0.238**   0.034 
NY  United Health  Delaware Valley  7,232  1,080  -0.165   0.186 
NY  Winthrop  Mid-Island  11,660  4,724   0.043   0.182 
NY  Winthrop  South Nassau  14,145  2,739  -0.209**  -0.117 
Notes:  
1.  Estimates based on results from an Ordered Logit model. 
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